McCarthy, Patrick. Albert Camus, The Stranger. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print.
Patrick McCarthy analyzes the issue of language and narration in Albert Camus’s The Stranger. His point of view involves the two different languages that are given in the beginning as the narrator. In this argument, McCarthy poses two different narrators portrayed as the same character: one being an unidentified “I,” who reads the telegram, and the other being the narrator-character, who obeys the commands, like mourning the loss of a mother. One of McCarthy‘s views is that the narrator-reader of the telegram “does not accept the telegram’s authority without criticism because ‘it doesn’t mean anything,’” the narrator-reader stated. He believes “that by depicting the narrator as a reader, The Stranger is indicating to us, its own readers, how we should tackle it: we should be wary of the traps and commands it contains” (15). He also believes that the narrator’s own language provides its own inadequacy by the use of first-person phrases like “I don’t know” and “perhaps.” McCarthy stresses the inability for the reader to identify with Meursault and feel for him “the imaginative sympathy that a reader feels for a traditional hero” (29). McCarthy believes that the way The Stranger is narrated “leads to further hesitation on the reader’s part” and criticizes the traditional novel, where the reader is lead to identify with the hero (28).
McCarthy suggests that the two narrators as the same character create and magnify Meursault’s apparent indifference. This argument addresses the contradictions and confusions that result from two narrators as one character within the narration, which in fact causes Meursault to appear indifferent. McCarthy’s standpoint about the narrator-reader not accepting the authority of the telegram while the narrator-character obeys the commands and necessary duties of the telegram indicates more possibilities of frustration for a reader who is unaware of the two narrators posing as one character. Also, McCarthy’s standpoint can help a reader distinguish between the contradictions and confusions within the narration and suggest possible reasons for a reader’s difficulty and skepticism in relating and understanding Meursault. McCarthy’s idea of the narrator-reader presents issues to a reader about the ethics of reading. This concept indicates some of the potential limitations that can be placed on a reader’s ability to experience the text when the narrator indicates how the novel should be read. Thus, a reader may lead to question the authority of the narrator and think about how the novel may have been limited to only the narrator-reader’s perspective. These questions may cause a reader to analyze and consider the possible experiences and interpretations that were left out of this perspective.
Showing posts with label Meursault as a Narrator-Character. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Meursault as a Narrator-Character. Show all posts
Friday, December 3, 2010
Proposal of Two Meursaults
Solomon, Robert C. “Is Meursault a Stranger to the Truth?” Readings on The Stranger. Ed. Derek C. Maus. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 2001. 61-75. Print
Solomon addresses his idea of Meursault as an existentialist man who neither lies nor tells the truth, because he cannot reach the level of consciousness where truth and falsity can be clarified. As the narrator of the novel, Meursault does not judge; he describes and observes. Solomon expresses how Meursault’s “indifference is a falsification of emotions” (75). He cannot be true to his feelings, not only because he does not know and understand them, but because he cannot even have them without making judgments. He is minimally self-conscious with only few thoughts in which he does not reflect on. Meursault’s “true feelings” are an emotionally stripped representation of human experience. Solomon states that “Meursault, for the first part of the novel, is an ideal sartrian pre-reflective consciousness, pure experience without reflection, always other than, but also nothing other than what he is conscious of at the moment” (64). Solomon argues that it is the “first-person standpoint that Camus allows the Kantian or Husserlian Ego to report on the utter blandness of Meursault’s pre-reflective consciousness as it matter-of-factly describes his world” (65). The problem is that the narrator of part I “cannot consistently be the same Meursault who is unreflectively experiencing. It must be another Meursault, a reflective Meursault.” (65). Solomon claims that the “trueness” for the reflective narrator would appear to be the bare, un-interpreted, and comment-less reporting of human experience of the pre-reflective Meursault’s. Also, he explains how there are “gaps in the narration where feelings ought to be in exactly the same way that there is an abyss where Meursault’s ‘soul’ ought to be” (67). Thus, Solomon justifies that Meursault of part I is an impossible character because he is the reflective narrator and the un-reflective bearer of experience.
Solomon’s idea about two Meursaults, the pre-reflective character and the reflective narrator, is relevant because it allows a reader to think about and categorize Meursault’s indifference as the result of two Meursaults in the narration, instead of completely labeling Meursault as inwardly indifferent. The reader could rationalize his indifference by the result of the complications that arise between Meursault’s existential role as character and inability to interpret and reflect on events and his role as narrator to be reflective. Solomon portrays the narrator of part I as “another Meursault,” which would enhance and highlight Meursault’s indifference and make it easily apparent for a reader, who wasn’t aware of “another Meursault” as the narrator. Another relevance of Solomon’s argument involves how the “gaps in narration” allow a reader to consider the possibility that these gaps are created by the effect of a pre-reflective character of Meursault as the reflective narrator. Even though these gaps may be what initially drives a reader to consider Meursault as indifferent, Solomon’s view on the gaps in the narration allow the reader to contemplate and analyze these gaps as the results from the complications between roles and the crossing of paths of the two Meursaults.
Solomon addresses his idea of Meursault as an existentialist man who neither lies nor tells the truth, because he cannot reach the level of consciousness where truth and falsity can be clarified. As the narrator of the novel, Meursault does not judge; he describes and observes. Solomon expresses how Meursault’s “indifference is a falsification of emotions” (75). He cannot be true to his feelings, not only because he does not know and understand them, but because he cannot even have them without making judgments. He is minimally self-conscious with only few thoughts in which he does not reflect on. Meursault’s “true feelings” are an emotionally stripped representation of human experience. Solomon states that “Meursault, for the first part of the novel, is an ideal sartrian pre-reflective consciousness, pure experience without reflection, always other than, but also nothing other than what he is conscious of at the moment” (64). Solomon argues that it is the “first-person standpoint that Camus allows the Kantian or Husserlian Ego to report on the utter blandness of Meursault’s pre-reflective consciousness as it matter-of-factly describes his world” (65). The problem is that the narrator of part I “cannot consistently be the same Meursault who is unreflectively experiencing. It must be another Meursault, a reflective Meursault.” (65). Solomon claims that the “trueness” for the reflective narrator would appear to be the bare, un-interpreted, and comment-less reporting of human experience of the pre-reflective Meursault’s. Also, he explains how there are “gaps in the narration where feelings ought to be in exactly the same way that there is an abyss where Meursault’s ‘soul’ ought to be” (67). Thus, Solomon justifies that Meursault of part I is an impossible character because he is the reflective narrator and the un-reflective bearer of experience.
Solomon’s idea about two Meursaults, the pre-reflective character and the reflective narrator, is relevant because it allows a reader to think about and categorize Meursault’s indifference as the result of two Meursaults in the narration, instead of completely labeling Meursault as inwardly indifferent. The reader could rationalize his indifference by the result of the complications that arise between Meursault’s existential role as character and inability to interpret and reflect on events and his role as narrator to be reflective. Solomon portrays the narrator of part I as “another Meursault,” which would enhance and highlight Meursault’s indifference and make it easily apparent for a reader, who wasn’t aware of “another Meursault” as the narrator. Another relevance of Solomon’s argument involves how the “gaps in narration” allow a reader to consider the possibility that these gaps are created by the effect of a pre-reflective character of Meursault as the reflective narrator. Even though these gaps may be what initially drives a reader to consider Meursault as indifferent, Solomon’s view on the gaps in the narration allow the reader to contemplate and analyze these gaps as the results from the complications between roles and the crossing of paths of the two Meursaults.
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